Regroup paper reviews

3 files changed, 68 insertions, 80 deletions

diff --git a/reviews/articles.md b/reviews/articles.md
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-# Phillip Rogaway - The Moral Character of Cryptographic Work
-
-:::: tags
-- Cryptography
-- Society
-::::
-
-An appeal to cryptographers to ponder on the [Russell-Einstein
-manifesto], consider the moral implications of their work, take a step
-back from "crypto-for-crypto", and focus on "crypto-for-privacy" (or,
-to name the threat more explicitly, "anti-surveillance research").
-
-Harps on FBI Director James Comey's "law-enforcement framing":
-
-> 1. Privacy is *personal* good.  It's about your desire to control
->    personal information about you.
-> 2. Security, on the other hand, is a *collective* good.  It's about
->    living in a safe and secure world.
-> 3. Privacy and security are inherently in conflict.  As you
->    strengthen one, you weaken the other.  We need to find the right
->    *balance*.
-> 4. Modern communications technology has destroyed the former
->    balance.  It's been a boon to privacy, and a blow to security.
->    Encryption is especially threatening.  Our laws just haven't kept
->    up.
-> 5. Because of this, *bad guys* may win.  The bad guys are
->    terrorists, murderers, child pornographers, drug traffickers, and
->    money launderers.  The technology that we good guys use - the bad
->    guys use it too, to escape detection.
-> 6. At this point, we run the risk of Going Dark.  Warrants will be
->    issued, but, due to encryption, they'll be meaningless.  We're
->    becoming a country of unopenable closets.  Default encryption may
->    make a good marketing pitch, but it's reckless design.  It will
->    lead us to a very dark place.
-
-This framing is dismissed as "inconsistent with the history of
-intelligence gathering, and with the NSA's own mission statement",
-without further explanation.
-
-I wish the author had spent some prose explaining how exactly this
-framing is fallacious.  There is a footnote providing some references,
-but as far as I can tell these references mainly reinforce the point
-that the NSA's surveillance methods are a threat to privacy; it is not
-obvious how "the NSA overreaches" contradicts "it's harder to catch
-bad guys once they get better crypto".
-
-For what it's worth, I found that [Aaron Brantly's
-article](#aaron-brantly---banning-encryption-to-stop-terrorists-a-worse-than-futile-exercise)
-does a better job at showing the shortsightedness of this line of
-reasoning, as does this footnote:
-
-> When crypto is outlawed only outlaws will have crypto.
-
-[Russell-Einstein manifesto]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell%E2%80%93Einstein_Manifesto
-
-# Aaron Brantly - Banning Encryption to Stop Terrorists: A Worse than Futile Exercise
-
-:::: tags
-- Cryptography
-- Society
-::::
-
-The debate can be phrased as follows:
-
-> Is increasing security in one narrow area worth degrading it in
-> every other?
-
-Answering "yes" overlooks two things:
-
-1. Weakening officially distributed encryption will not impact
-   terrorists, who will simply move to new, unregulated platforms.
-
-2. Once they have done that, we end up in a situation where lawful
-   citizens are stuck with insecure communication channels, and
-   terrorists are the only ones benefiting from state-of-the-art
-   confidentiality/integrity/authenticity.
diff --git a/reviews/articles.org b/reviews/articles.org
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index 0000000..8727606
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+* The Moral Character of Cryptographic Work :crypto:society:
+An appeal to cryptographers to ponder on the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell%E2%80%93Einstein_Manifesto][Russell-Einstein
+manifesto]], consider the moral implications of their work, take a step
+back from "crypto-for-crypto", and focus on "crypto-for-privacy" (or,
+to name the threat more explicitly, "anti-surveillance research").
+
+Harps on FBI Director James Comey's "law-enforcement framing":
+
+#+begin_quote
+1. Privacy is /personal/ good.  It's about your desire to control
+   personal information about you.
+2. Security, on the other hand, is a /collective/ good.  It's about
+   living in a safe and secure world.
+3. Privacy and security are inherently in conflict.  As you strengthen
+   one, you weaken the other.  We need to find the right /balance/.
+4. Modern communications technology has destroyed the former balance.
+   It's been a boon to privacy, and a blow to security.  Encryption is
+   especially threatening.  Our laws just haven't kept up.
+5. Because of this, /bad guys/ may win.  The bad guys are terrorists,
+   murderers, child pornographers, drug traffickers, and money
+   launderers.  The technology that we good guys use - the bad guys
+   use it too, to escape detection.
+6. At this point, we run the risk of Going Dark.  Warrants will be
+   issued, but, due to encryption, they'll be meaningless.  We're
+   becoming a country of unopenable closets.  Default encryption may
+   make a good marketing pitch, but it's reckless design.  It will
+   lead us to a very dark place.
+#+end_quote
+
+This framing is dismissed as "inconsistent with the history of
+intelligence gathering, and with the NSA's own mission statement",
+without further explanation.
+
+I wish the author had spent some prose explaining how exactly this
+framing is fallacious.  There is a footnote providing some references,
+but as far as I can tell these references mainly reinforce the point
+that the NSA's surveillance methods are a threat to privacy; it is not
+obvious how "the NSA overreaches" contradicts "it's harder to catch
+bad guys once they get better crypto".
+
+For what it's worth, I found that [[#banning-encryption-to-stop-terrorists-a-worse-than-futile-exercise][Aaron Brantly's article]] does a
+better job at showing the shortsightedness of this line of reasoning,
+as does this footnote:
+
+#+begin_quote
+When crypto is outlawed only outlaws will have crypto.
+#+end_quote
+* Banning Encryption to Stop Terrorists: A Worse than Futile Exercise :crypto:society:
+The debate can be phrased as follows:
+
+#+begin_quote
+Is increasing security in one narrow area worth degrading it in every
+other?
+#+end_quote
+
+Answering "yes" overlooks two things:
+
+1. Weakening officially distributed encryption will not impact
+   terrorists, who will simply move to new, unregulated platforms.
+
+2. Once they have done that, we end up in a situation where lawful
+   citizens are stuck with insecure communication channels, and
+   terrorists are the only ones benefiting from state-of-the-art
+   confidentiality/integrity/authenticity.
+* [[https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.06171][The Usability of Ownership]] :rust:
+I'm glad I learned "incompleteness" as a more concise way to express
+"the borrow checker not being smart enough to accept code that does
+not violate Rust's theoretical ownership rules".
diff --git a/reviews/papers.org b/reviews/papers.org
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-* [[https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.06171][The Usability of Ownership]] :rust:
-I'm glad I learned "incompleteness" as a more concise way to express
-"the borrow checker not being smart enough to accept code that does
-not violate Rust's theoretical ownership rules".