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| author | Kévin Le Gouguec <kevin.legouguec@gmail.com> | 2019-05-04 22:39:20 +0200 |
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| committer | Kévin Le Gouguec <kevin.legouguec@gmail.com> | 2019-05-04 22:41:06 +0200 |
| commit | f925746e0959bbac13bef08fc70f326a8a58818a (patch) | |
| tree | 4f26beb81e9b1df9e869795af10fc839ef900d07 /technical/reviews/articles.md | |
| parent | a3bd3c43fa8faa9c0fe6aaa6dfa02e3d3d8bdbb9 (diff) | |
| download | memory-leaks-f925746e0959bbac13bef08fc70f326a8a58818a.tar.xz | |
Add notes on (politically-charged) crypto articles
Diffstat (limited to 'technical/reviews/articles.md')
| -rw-r--r-- | technical/reviews/articles.md | 76 |
1 files changed, 76 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/technical/reviews/articles.md b/technical/reviews/articles.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..82dc7ee --- /dev/null +++ b/technical/reviews/articles.md @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +# Phillip Rogaway - The Moral Character of Cryptographic Work + +:::: tags +- Cryptography +- Society +:::: + +An appeal to cryptographers to ponder on the [Russell-Einstein +manifesto], consider the moral implications of their work, take a step +back from "crypto-for-crypto", and focus on "crypto-for-privacy" (or, +to name the threat more explicitly, "anti-surveillance research"). + +Harps on FBI Director James Comey's "law-enforcement framing": + +> 1. Privacy is *personal* good. It's about your desire to control +> personal information about you. +> 2. Security, on the other hand, is a *collective* good. It's about +> living in a safe and secure world. +> 3. Privacy and security are inherently in conflict. As you +> strengthen one, you weaken the other. We need to find the right +> *balance*. +> 4. Modern communications technology has destroyed the former +> balance. It's been a boon to privacy, and a blow to security. +> Encryption is especially threatening. Our laws just haven't kept +> up. +> 5. Because of this, *bad guys* may win. The bad guys are +> terrorists, murderers, child pornographers, drug traffickers, and +> money launderers. The technology that we good guys use - the bad +> guys use it too, to escape detection. +> 6. At this point, we run the risk of Going Dark. Warrants will be +> issued, but, due to encryption, they'll be meaningless. We're +> becoming a country of unopenable closets. Default encryption may +> make a good marketing pitch, but it's reckless design. It will +> lead us to a very dark place. + +This framing is dismissed as "inconsistent with the history of +intelligence gathering, and with the NSA's own mission statement", +without further explanation. + +I wish the author had spent some prose explaining how exactly this +framing is fallacious. There is a footnote providing some references, +but as far as I can tell these references mainly reinforce the point +that the NSA's surveillance methods are a threat to privacy; it is not +obvious how "the NSA overreaches" contradicts "it's harder to catch +bad guys once they get better crypto". + +For what it's worth, I found that [Aaron Brantly's +article](#aaron-brantly---banning-encryption-to-stop-terrorists-a-worse-than-futile-excercise) +does a better job at showing the shortsightedness of this line of +reasoning, as does this footnote: + +> When crypto is outlawed only outlaws will have crypto. + +[Russell-Einstein manifesto]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell%E2%80%93Einstein_Manifesto + +# Aaron Brantly - Banning Encryption to Stop Terrorists: A Worse than Futile Excercise + +:::: tags +- Cryptography +- Society +:::: + +The debate can be phrased as follows: + +> Is increasing security in one narrow area worth degrading it in +> every other? + +Answering "yes" overlooks two things: + +1. Weakening officially distributed encryption will not impact + terrorists, who will simply move to new, unregulated platforms. + +2. Once they have done that, we end up in a situation where lawful + citizens are stuck with insecure communication channels, and + terrorists are the only ones benefiting from state-of-the-art + confidentiality/integrity/authenticity. |
